The Indian army's latest effort to turn itself into a lean and mean fighting force must reach its logical conclusion without being torpedoed by internal pulls and pressures. Defence ministry accounted for 17% of central government expenditure in 2018-19, but even without including defence pensions, revenue expenditure like salaries dwarfed capital expenditure for acquisitions and modernisation by a 2:1 ratio. Amid much sparser allocations for health and education which are equally important priority areas, army top brass will know there is little leeway for the government to drastically hike defence spending. To widen the capital expenditure pie, the army must thus look inward. Given the changing nature of warfare, which is likely to be short and decisive, it also makes strategic sense to require more special operations forces, cyber war capabilities and integrated/joint operational capabilities. A bloated force is a drag on resources and will lead the army to be under-equipped in hardware (and software) that it really needs. Measures under consideration include downsizing of army headquarters to reduce staff duties and creating integrated brigades to replace most of the 49 divisional headquarters. India can take a leaf out of the playbook of China, which announced in March that it slashed 3 lakh troops after vowing last year to shed 10 lakh ground troops. China's trimming efforts were accompanied by a capital expenditure push even as Indian generals bemoan the shrinking of modernisation budgets. The army would also do well to abandon colonial practices like the sahayak system and review the hiring of civilian personnel. The ballooning of pensions in recent years is also eating into finances that could otherwise be spent on new acquisitions. There can be no compromise on defence preparedness. reform would mean that bad loan problem narrative move away from being one of just corruption to institutional reform. This will help build a robust financial system to support durable double digit growth. The Indian army's latest effort to turn itself into a lean and mean fighting force must reach its logical conclusion without being torpedoed by internal pulls and pressures. Defence ministry accounted for 17% of central government expenditure in 2018-19, but even without including defence pensions, revenue expenditure like salaries dwarfed capital expenditure for acquisitions and modernisation by a 2:1 ratio. Amid much sparser allocations for health and education which are equally important priority areas, army top brass will know there is little leeway for the government to drastically hike defence spending. To widen the capital expenditure pie, the army must thus look inward. Given the changing nature of warfare, which is likely to be short and decisive, it also makes strategic sense to require more special operations forces, cyber war capabilities and integrated/joint operational